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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 12-2981 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
RICHARD SPISAK, 
                  Appellant 
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-11-cr-00669-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 7, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Richard Spisak appeals the 32-month sentence that the district court imposed on 
him following his guilty plea to one count of engaging in a sexual act with a ward.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment. 
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 As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we need not reiterate the details of Spisak’s offense.  
 Because the defendant failed to object at sentencing to the government’s 
presentation of evidence, we review for plain error.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).  Under the 
plain error standard, the appellant must show that “(1) an error was committed; (2) the 
error was plain, that is, it is ‘clear’ and ‘obvious;’ and (3) the error affected [the 
defendant’s] substantial rights.”  United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(alteration in original).  If the appellant makes that showing, we may correct the 
sentencing error, but only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Dixon, 308 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citations omitted).   
 The defendant argues that the district court committed plain error by granting the 
upward variance based on the testimony of the two additional inmates.  In support of this 
argument, he attempts to rely on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  In Apprendi, the Court declared: “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490.  The Court reaffirmed this holding in Booker.  543 
U.S. at 244.  The defendant claims that this  precedent compels a finding of plain error 
because the district court—and not a jury—found facts that resulted in a sentence 
exceeding his maximum Guidelines range. We disagree. 
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Because the Guidelines are now advisory and only one factor a judge must 
consider when sentencing, they do not increase the maximum sentence to which a 
defendant is exposed; “[t]hey merely inform the judge’s broad discretion.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565 (3d Cir. 2007).  As a result, sentencing judges can sentence 
defendants up to the statutory maximum based on evidence presented at sentencing as 
long as the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element 
of the offense of conviction, or has admitted guilt pursuant to a valid change of plea 
proceeding.  Id. at 561, 
Moreover, even if the district court had erred in crediting the testimony of the two 
other victims, the error would have been harmless because it is clear that it did not affect 
the defendant’s sentence. Rather, the district court concluded that an upward variance 
would have been warranted even without their testimony. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s judgment.    
